>From MCELROY@zodiac.rutgers.edu  Ukn Jan 11 19:02:55 1993

SINN FEIN AND LOCAL ELECTIONS: THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND. by Colin Knox. From Parliamentary Affairs. October 1,
1990.


      The emergence of Provisional Sinn Fein, the political wing of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), as an electoral force in Northern
Ireland politics since 1981 has been problematic for the British government.
Sinn Fein's strategy of a joint military and political campaign to achieve a united
Ireland, embodied in their protestation 'while not everyone can plant a bomb,
everyone can plant a vote' is considered both provocative and anti-democratic.
The British government, however, has played an active, if in retrospective
counterproductive, part in Sinn Fein's political pursuits. Ending the
proscription of Sinn Fein in 1975 was a serious attempt to encourage advocates
of violence into political process and by doing so to distance them from the
IRA. It was hoped that the politics of persuasion and argument would ultimately
convince Sinn Feiners of the benefits to be gained through active participation
in the democratic process and simultaneously divide opinion on the need to
continue a military campaign. This approach by the government met with limited
success and short of proscription, which the Prime Minister is against, a
number of legislative measures have been introduced aimed primarily at Sinn
Fein.
      These measures influence the way elections are conducted and
circumscribed the election campaign. Firstly, the legislation alters the rules of
voting--voters must produce identification, candidates must sign an anti-
violence declaration. This makes Northern Ireland an exception within the
United Kingdom for electoral purposes. Secondly, a 'media ban' on Sinn Fein
(and others) severely curtails political communication which, given the primacy
of television as a means of electoral communication, may damage the party's
success at the polls. This article traces the influence of the new measures on
Sinn Fein in the 1989 local elections and reflects upon their joint electoral and
military strategy.

The Local Government System

      Local government in Northern Ireland is a relatively powerless political
forum within which 566 councilors are elected by the single transferable vote
method of proportional representation to 26 single tier authorities. The councils
are responsible for a minor range of functions, principally the provision of
street cleaning, refuse collection, cemeteries and recreation services, to a
population of 1.6 million. Their insignificance ia apparent from their 1989-90
budget of 140 million pounds or 2.6 percent of planned public expenditure in
the province.
      The present local government system, based upon the Local Government
(NI) Act 1972, is the by-product of two convergent problems which surfaced in
the late 1960's. The first problem was an administrative one: a large number
(73) of small local authorities and development commissions were then
responsible for a range of services financed from a relatively small rate (tax)
base. Their efficiency became a matter of concern for the Stormont government
and resulted in two White Papers setting out reform proposals. At the same time
the Redcliffe-Maud (1969) and Wheatly (1972) reports set out to simplify the
British system of local government by reducing the number of councils and
strengthening local democracy. The second problem was a political one: for civil
rights campaigners, local authorities epitomized Unionist domination and misuse
of power. Allegations of discrimination in jobs and housing, alongside
gerrymandering of local authority boundaries and restricted voting franchise,
precipitated the civil disturbances of 1968. At this point, in the words of one
commentator, the "transcendence of the Unionist state and the reform of local
government merged as a single issue."
      The Northern Ireland government appointed a review body on local
government with the principal aim of considering its efficiency. Its conclusions,
influenced by proposals for reform in Scotland, were a division into regional
and district functions with a Stormont Parliament responsible for the former and
26 districts the latter. The recommendations were incorporated into the 1972
Act. The two-tier system was superseded, however, by the abolition of the
Stormont Parliament in March 1972 and the imposition of direct rule under which
Northern Ireland ministers are now responsible for regional services. Local
government therefore evolved from the political turmoil of the early 1970's
against a background of significant changes in local service administration and
special circumstances of street protests, riots and bombings prevalent at that
time.
      Elections to the new councils were held in May 1973 under the STV/PR
system. This had the effect of increasing competition for fewer councils seats
and reducing the number of local authorities controlled by single party. 
Unionists resented the loss of council powers and the abolition of their
Parliament but participated in the new system of local government. From 1973 to
1985 occasional skirmishes with the British government occurred over security
policy and resulted in a semi-boycott of council meetings in 1981. Some councils
engaged in what was termed the 'politics of irresponsibility', denigrating the
services of various statutory providers such as the Housing Executive which
had taken over those functions from local authorities. Political and sectarian
conflict also emerged on occasions in the appointment of council chairmen and
representatives to area health and education boards. The fairly low-key nature
councils' responsibilities conceals the fact that they are an important political
and symbolic forum for local politicians. As observers have noted, "while
denuded of powers, the councils have functioned as the major indigenous arenas
for politics during most of the direct rule period." This is particularly true
from 1985 onwards with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the
emergence of Sinn Finn as representatives on the councils.

Sinn Fein in Local Government
      
      Until 1981, Sinn Fein had a limited involvement in the electoral politics of
Northern Ireland, which it regarded as an adjunct to armed resistance (vested
in the IRA) against the British presence. McAllister and Nelson summarized its
position: "In theory, Provisional Sinn Fein's policies combine non-sectarianism
and socialism. In practice, however, these commitments are purely nominal and
its policies are a rudimentary combination of orthodox physical-force
republicanism and Catholic conservatism. The organization's primary aim is
simply to remove the British presence from Northern Ireland and establish a
United Ireland."
      During the lifetime of the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont (1921-
1971) both provincial and Westminster elections were held and Sinn Fein rarely
contested the former. Legal requirement obliged candidates to declare that they
would take their seats if elected and recognize the lawful authority of Stormont
(Representation of the People (NI) Act of 1934, Electoral Law (NI) 1962). Both
were anathema to Sinn Fein which competed for Westminster elections as
abstentionists, refusing to confer legitimacy upon Northern Ireland as a part of
the United Kingdom.
      After the outbreak of civil disturbances in 1969, the republican movement
split into the Republican Clubs, whose military wing was the Official IRA, and
the Provisional IRA (Provos). The Provos accused the Official movement of not
defending Ulster Catholics at a crucial period and established Provisional Sinn
Fein as their political front in 1970. Sinn Fein refused to contest the Northern
Ireland Assembly elections of June 1973 and the Constitutional Convention
elections of May 1975, engaging in boycotting/abstentionist campaigns.
Westminster officials actively participated in discussions with Sinn Fein and
agreed to incident centers being set up (staffed by Sinn Fein and government
officials) in Catholic areas to monitor the IRA ceasefire and prevent escalating
violence. This provoked adverse reactions from the Catholic Social Democratic
and Labour Party (SDLP) and Unionists alike.
      The 1980/81 hunger strikes against the abolition of political status in the
Maze prison and the associated bad press for the British government provided
Sinn Fein with an electoral opportunity under the guise of 'Anti-H-Block'
campaigners. Bobby Sands, the hunger strike leader, won a Westminster by-
election in 1981, followed by Owen Carron. Although Sinn Finn leaders were
reluctant at embarking upon this electoral strategy they were also encouraged
by its success. This was bolstered by Sinn Fein, again standing as 'Anti-H-
Block' candidates, gaining 7.7 percent of the vote in the council elections of
1981.
      As a result of its electoral successes, Sinn Finn mounted a direct
challenge to the SDLP. Although firmly committed to the 'armed struggle', it
adopted the joint 'ballot box/armalite' strategy at its 1981 conference and
contested the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections. This was part of the
Secretary of State's (Jim Prior) 'rolling devolution' scheme, aimed at the
resumption of legislative and executive functions by a N.I Assembly. Sinn Fein
achieved 10.1 percent of the votes compared with the SDLP's 18.8 percent vote.
In the June 1983 Westminster elections Sinn Fein gained 13.4 of the poll as
against 17.9 for the SDLP. At this point Sinn Fein threatened to displace the
SDLP as the main party of the Nationalist community. The threat receded in the
European elections of June 1984 when John Hume (22.1) achieved a significant
victory over Sinn Fein's Danny Morrison (13.3). Chastened by their contest
with the SDLP, Sinn Fein were more cautious in their claims for the 1985 local
government elections although by this stage had committed themselves firmly to
the electoral process. Academic observers noted 'regardless of all disavowals,
the Provos are now trapped to some degree in the search for electoral approval.
Others saw the political strategy not as a 'trap' but a decisive move away from
a 'form of republicanism that was outmoded, outvoted and outgunned.'

Local elections 1985 and 1989

      This potted summary of Sinn Fein's involvement in Northern Ireland
politics is a necessary preface to the party's active participation in local
government since 1985 and the associated electoral constraints placed upon it.
>From the early 1980's Sinn Fein became involved in community politics through
participation in residents' and tenants' associations, the management of
community centers and a network of advice centers. Such were the problems of
economic social depravation, including very high rates of unemployment, that
inner city areas of Belfast and Derry proved to be very receptive to hard-
working Sinn Fein activists. This provided an infrastructure upon which the
Party could build local council electoral support. Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein
president, launching the manifesto in April 1985, claimed the party was not out
to maximize the Republican vote in the election, but rather to consolidate the
Republican base. The election, he indicated, would be used as an organizational
campaign, to consolidate in selected areas, and to put forward a new local
leadership for the purpose of propagandizing, organizing and building the
party. The main electoral of both Unionist parties--the Ulster Unionists (UUP)
and Democratic Unionists (DUP)--was to 'smash Sinn Fein' and ostracize those
who were elected, by a policy of exclusion and isolation.
      Sinn Fein achieved 11.8 of the votes compared with 17.8 by the SDLP.
This secured a Sinn Fein presence of 59 seats on 17 of Northern Ireland's
district councils. Of the 59 councilors, eleven had been convicted of terrorist-
type offenses and six others had received convictions for scheduled offenses.
As predicted by Unionist parties, local government witnessed a period of
considerable disarray initially stemming from Sinn Fein's involvement on local
councils and soon afterwards from the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
Unionist councils adopted a series of disruptive tactics including adjournments,
refusal to set rates, legal challenges and publicity campaigns, finally
resumpting normal business when all their efforts had failed to shift the
government's position on the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
      Such was the background to the 1989 local government elections in which
Sinn Fein's presence on local councils had been all but eclipsed by opposition to
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Sinn Fein claimed in its 1989 election manifesto
that: "The British government's military forces and Loyalist death squads have
done their utmost to wipe out Sinn Fein councilors, organizers, election
workers, supporters and legal representatives. This is the election the British
government never intended Sinn Fein to contest." Gerry Adams voiced criticism
of the increasing number of IRA 'mistakes' in which civilians were injured or
killed. This was met with derision and contempt by political opponents who
viewed is as an attempt to rationalize Sinn Fein's brand of politics and violence.
Its vote dropped marginally from 11.8 in 1985 to 11.2 in 1989, while the SDLP
vote increased significantly from 17.8 to 21. Sinn Fein's representation
decreased from memberships of 17 councils to 14 through a relatively poor
performance in rural areas but concentrated support in hard core areas of
Belfast, Derry, Newry and Mourne, Fermanagh and Omagh.

The Government Response

      The British government's response to Sinn Fein's presence in council
chambers has ostensibly been an acceptance of the wished of the republican
electorate. At the same time, however, a number of legislative measures have
been adopted to control and restrict Sinn Fein electorally. These are considered
below.

                        Proof of Voters' Identity

      The government introduced legislation--the Elections (N.I.) Act 1985--
which required all voters to produce evidence of their identity before being
allowed to vote. This was inspired by claims that Sinn Fein's vote in the 1982
Assembly and the 1983 Westminster elections had been bolstered by
"personation" (the legal term for impersonation) and other frauds on polling
day--referred to colloquially as 'vote early and vote often'. Evidence of
electoral malpractice is provided by the number of 'tendered' ballot papers
issued (special ballot papers submitted by genuine electors whose votes had
already been cast). There were 762 and 949 in 1982 and 1983 elections
respectively. The largest numbers were evident in constituencies with a
Nationalist electorate and Sinn Fein presence--Belfast West, Belfast North, Mid-
Ulster, Foyle and Newry & Armagh. At the same elections there were 26 and 149
arrests for impersonation. Allegations were made that as much as 20 percent of
the Sinn Fein vote had been acquired by malpractice in what the Secretary of
State referred to as "an organized militaristic campaign on a wide scale to steal
people's vote." In an effort th tackle such abuses the new law, first introduced
for the 1985 council elections, required all voters to produce one of the
following documents--a current driving licence, a medical card, a social
services' allowance book (e.g. pension or child allowance book), a British of
Republic of Ireland passport, a marriage certificate (for a woman married within
two years of the elections).
      All constitutional parties were agreed on the principle of tackling
electoral abuse but there was widespread dissent over the documentation
required and its effectiveness in solving the problem. Moreover the question of
Northern Ireland being treated differently prompted Unionists to argue that
'there should be an assurance of the integrity of the electoral process
throughout the United Kingdom." In other words, parity of treatment under
electoral law should exist for all citizens of the United Kingdom. This was a
facile proposition, according to the government, given the very different
electoral systems which already existed in Northern Ireland. Parliamentary
elections in Northern Ireland were held under the simple majority system, while
local government and European elections use the single transferable vote form
of proportional representation. Impersonation did not pose a problem in Great
Britain, moreover, and elections there were free from paramilitary interference.
On Northern Ireland minister (Nicholas Scott) acknowledged that the legislation
represented a departure from the traditional British way of holding elections
but questioned which was the lesser of two evils: "To have another difference
between the electoral system in Northern Ireland and that which obtains in
Great Britain, or to allow the democratic process to be undermined by those
who seek to poison and destroy it."
      In impact of the electoral law has been significant--arrests have
plummeted but the cost of this, according the Northern Ireland politicians, has
been a sizeable number (Enoch Powell suggested as much as 10 percent) being
prevented from voting because of documentation difficulties. ALthough a
problem of forging medical cards still exists, the issue of wide-scale
impersonation has ended as a result of the process of identification.

                        Anti-Violence Declaration

      A second important piece of legislation was introduced in the form of the
Elected Authorities (N.I.) Act 1988 which, inter alia, required candidates at
district council elections to make a declaration against terrorism. Candidates are
required to endorse the following declaration: I declare that, if elected, I will
not by word or deed express support for or approval of (a) Any organization
that is for the time being a proscribed organization specified in Schedule 2 of
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 or (b) Acts of terrorism
(that is to say, violence for political ends) connected with the affairs of
Northern Ireland.
      This was clearly (although not exclusively) aimed at Sinn Fein candidates
standing in the 1989 local elections. The law does not ban candidates standing
on a programme involving violence, but if elected the declaration applies.
      The measure met with considerable opposition. Opponents (Labour Party
and SDLP) argued that a battery of powers already existed in criminal law to
deal with the expression of support for violence and that Sinn Fein would sign
the declaration regardless, moreover it would provide Sinn Fein with a
propaganda bonus as a subjugated minority party being electorally oppressed
because of its policies. The legislation however attracted most criticism over the
issue of enforcement in which the onus is placed on councils, councillors and
individual citizens to take action against those in breach of the law--a civil
rather than criminal offense. Different standards of proof are requires; in the
former the 'balance of probabilities' is used, whereas in the latter the Director
of Public Prosecutions is required to prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt' the law
has been breached. That the government opted for civil enforcement not only
placed an undue pressure on individuals who could be subjected to intimidation
and financial hardship (if the action failed) but also exposed a lack of
confidence by government in the measures involved. As one Unionist put it: "If
the DPP is not given a role, we had better be clear what we are asking local
government representatives to do--we are asking them to sign their own death
warrants." Unionist representatives argued ideally for outright proscription of
Sinn Fein but more realistically for the declaration to include a repudiation of
violence. Not advocating or supporting violence as the declaration demanded
was quite different from rejecting it.
      The law applies only to local councils in Northern Ireland. Elections to
the Westminster and European Parliaments within Northern Ireland are
excluded, as are all British elections. This serves only to highlight the
anomalies in electoral law throughout the United Kingdom. The predictions are
that the courts will become heavily involved in arbitrating on the vaguely
worded declaration. Loyalist and Nationalists will goad each other into violating
the law, and local government will continue to be a turbulent political forum.

                            Broadcasting Ban

      Perhaps the most stringent legislative measure to affect local government
has been the restrictions on broadcasting precipitated by an upsurge of IRA
violence in the summer of 1988. The killing of eight soldiers on an army bus in
Ballygawley resulted in a new security package which included a media ban on
Sinn Fein (and others),the anti-violence oath described, the ending of the
right to silence for suspects questioned by police and a cut in remission for
offenders.
      The BBC operates under Licence and Agreement arrangements and the
Independent Broadcasting Authority is regulated by the Broadcasting Act of
1981, both of which give the Home Secretary extensive power to determine what
may or may not be broadcast. In October 1988 he issued notices to the BBC and
the IBA requiring them to refrain from broadcasting direct statements by
representatives of organizations proscribed in the UK (The IRA, the UFF and
the Red Hand Commandos) and by representatives of Sinn Fein and the Ulster
Defense Association (UDA). The directives also prohibit the broadcasting of
statements by any person which support or invite support for these
organizations--'words spoken by a person who appears or is heard on the
programme on which the matter is broadcast where the person speaking the
words represents, or reports to represent, one of the organizations specified."
Non-compliance with the notices would result in 'action against the regulatory
authorities', interpreted by O'Maolain as the imposition of a server penalty to
avoid the withdrawal or suspension of their broadcast licence or some other
punishment by way of a variation to their licence. The restriction do not apply
to the broadcast of proceedings in Parliament and have a 'more limited effect'
during election periods. The government view was that broadcasters had legal
obligations of impartiality when covering elections and these should not be
undermined by a more general media ban.
      The rational behind the broadcasting ban was to deny those who
propagate terrorism access to radio and television. The government argued that
the measures taken were not a restriction on reporting but on direct
appearances by those who use or support violence. As the Home Secretary put
it: "This is not censorship, because it does not deal with  or prohibit the
reporting of events. It deals with and prohibits direct access and its extra
impact on terrorism and its supporters. Broadly, we are putting broadcasters
on the same basis as a representative of the written press.:
      In general the ban received a welcome from both Unionist parties. They
interpreted it as the beginning of 'an inevitable process designed to squeeze
Sinn Fein out of the political system in Northern Ireland." The main Nationalist
party (SDLP) argued that such measures were ill-conceived because Sinn Fein
and the IRA would reap propaganda value from portraying the British
government as repressive. Moreover, the effects of the ban would be negligible
in that opportunities for reporting opinions of terrorist organizations on
television would not be reduced. A loophole allowed personal appearances with
'voice-overs' carrying the exact words or a paraphrase of them. The ban would
therefore have limited practical impact yet damage the government's legal
challenge, claiming that it was unlawful and in breach of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Sinn Fein claimed that its political opponents were
given an electoral advantage since it had no right to reply to verbal attacks--
and this would encourage disinformation. The party cited the decrease in
inquires to the Belfast Republican Press Centre from broadcasting authorities
affected by the ban--from 471 in the four month before to its imposition 10 110
in the following four months.
      In practice, confusion over interpretation of the ban and the guidelines
to be followed within broadcasting has led to a form of self-censorship by the
media. In January 1990, for example, the launch of a Sinn Fein Housing
document asking the government to inject 40 million pounds of extra resources
for the West Belfast areas was carried by the BBC. Gerry Adams (in his own
voice) explained the reasons for the request. Ulster Television carried the
report but the IBA instructed it not to use Gerry Adams's voice. Broadcasters
have erred on the side of caution, unwilling to test the parameters of the ban.
The reporting of local government issues, ostensibly unrelated to the substance
of the legislation, has suffered a similar fate. Sinn Fein's case for publishing
Belfast City Council's minutes in Irish was considered too troublesome by the
BBC to report, faced with muddled interpretation of the ban.


The 1989 Local Elections--The Sinn Fein Perspective

      The extent to which the three measures described above effected Sinn
Fein in the 1989 local government elections varied considerably. In the case of
proof of identity, three elections had taken place since its introduction (1985
council elections, 1986 UK by-elections and 1987 UK general elections) and the
electorate were aware of the documentation required. Less confusion and
ambiguity prevailed and political parties were not as involved in educating their
supporters, as was the case in 1985. Humorist remarked that election
campaigning did not take place in graveyards, for the purpose of stealing
votes, as before.
      The impact of the anti-violence legislation on the Sinn Fein campaign was
negligible. The sitting Republican Sinn Fein candidates (3 in number) were not
allowed to defend their seats when they refused to sign the declaration, but
Provisional Sinn Fein candidates signed it before the 1989 elections on the
grounds that they would not be denied the right to represent their electorate.
They accused the government of being hypocritical on violence as applied
through the repressive tactics. of the Royal ulster Constabulary (RUC) and
British army and of using the declaration as a way of forcing Sinn Fein to
abandon its electoral strategy. Government intentions in relation to the anti
violence oath were clearly thwarted and its potential effects on Sinn Fein
outmaneuvered.
      The media ban had a marginal influence on Sinn Fein in the 1989 local
elections simply because of its limited period of operation (October 1988-May
1989). However, the party argues that its cumulative impact will seriously
damage its electoral prospects. Sinn Fein suggests that a hard core Republican
vote exists in Northern Ireland and is unlikely to be wooed by its main
Nationalist rival (SDLP) or any other party. In areas of Northern Ireland where
party organizational difficulties exist, the key task for Sinn Fein is to
encourage its supporters to vote.
      The media ban will present it with increasing difficulties in reaching
potential voters and consolidating their support. The pre-election respite, in
which the ban 'has limited effect', is viewed as a political sop to those who
oppose the measure and n no way compensates for lack of media exposure and
the promotion of political policies at any time. Because the Representation of the
Peoples Act requires the BBC and IBA to give coverage to all election
candidates (ensuring that one party is not given more favourable treatment
than another), the Ulster Unionists suggested that all other parties desist from
using television in Northern Ireland during the elections to stop Sinn Fein from
doing so.
      Sinn Fein argues that the three measures should not be viewed in
isolation but as part of an ongoing concerted campaign of repression by the
government, destined to fail. It cites similar restrictions in the Republic of
Ireland such as that which prohibits the broadcasting of material that promotes
any organization supporting violence. As one commentator noted: "Repression
will not crush republican support...the exclusion of Sinn Fein from the
airwaves, curbs on their elected officials, harassment, brutality and
manipulation of the law to secure conditions...is likely to increase the alienation
of republican sympathizers."
           Faced with such restrictions, Sinn Fein has deployed a series of
measures to get is electoral message across. When incidents of political
significance occur about which inn Fein feels it has a right to respond and
the media have a responsibility to elicit its views, the party lobbies journalists,
news editors and producers. For example, in January 1990 three criminals
raided a betting shop in West Belfast and were shot dead by undercover British
troops: Sinn Fein lobbied the media to carry the Republican response, as
opposed to the more regular appearance of an SDLP spokesman, since the
incident took place within Gerry Adams' constituency. Journalists are also
lobbied, manly to the Irish News, Belfast Telegraph and occasionally the Irish
News. Leafleting, news sheets and bulletins are seen as another important
means of dissemination views, in particular the weekly Sinn Fein paper An
Phoblacht/Republican News, with 44,000 sold weekly and a claimed readership
of 100,000 people. Such methods were expensive, however, which created
difficulties for a party with limited electoral base and limited financial
resources.
      In the course of the 1989 campaign Sinn Fein claimed harassment,
intimidation and the arrest of party workers involved in distributing posters
and election material by the security forces. In the absence of funds for major
advertising in the pre-election period (engaged in by rival), Sinn Fein voters
may be less aware of the need to support the party at the ballot box. Media
prompting is necessary to stimulate the electorally apathetic but no less
committed Republican. The ongoing impact of the media ban was described by
the Party's Publicity officer: "By the time we reach Westminster elections in
1992/92, censorship will be the dominant factor in our ability or inability to
campaign effectively and get out our vote. At that stage we will have been
banned from the broadcasting media for a period of three or four years. During
that time other political parties will have presented themselves in a way which
demonstrates to viewers and potential voters their ability to represent them.
Marginalization of Sinn Fein will have been strengthened by censorship."
      Election campaigning was seen as much more than the pre-election
courting of voters by Sinn Fein. Its involvement in community politics, based
upon local organizations and advice centres, presented the party in a way
which demonstrated a continuing commitment to daily economic and social
problems, more important in the short-term for voters than constitutional
issues. Being part of their electoral base, in the way other parties (with the
exception of the DUP) were not, Sinn Fein's candidates and politicians could
empathize with the problems of the community in which they live.

Curbing Sinn Fein?

      Rose has argued that the dilemma facing governments confronting an
'anti-system' party is more apparent than real. If such a party has little
popular support, then allowing it to fight elections will demonstrate its
weakness. On the other hand, trying to ban an 'anti-system' party which has a
large measure of support is futile is futile. ALthough the British government
has been reluctant to proscribe Sinn Fein, to what extent have the measures
described above curbed the party's anti-democratic excesses or damaged it
electorally?
      Taken together, the elections (NI) Act 1985, the Elected Authorities (NI)
Act 1988 and the media ban directive of October 1988 appear to have a limited
impact on the 1989 elections. The ongoing, prohibitive and rigorous application
of the media ban will however create problems for Sinn Fein. Each of the three
measures could be seen as an insidious attack by government on a legal political
party. An attack on the rights of elected officials, regardless of their views, is
an attack on the electorate and the democratic process itself. Equivocation by
the government has been criticized by the SDLP: "The fact that you have
people elected under a particular party ticket is part of the democratic process
and you cannot tinker with that. Either you ban people entirely from the
democratic process, or you accept the consequences of a democratic decision--
you cannot have it both ways."
      The long term consequences for Sinn Fein's electoral support must of
course be speculative. Experience to date suggests that the party's electoral
appeal is linked to factors such as the fortunes of the SDLP, the political
ambience and other extraneous factors (e.g. conflict over segregation of
prisoners). When political tensions are high, Sinn Fein benefits electorally. Its
1982 Assembly and 1983 Westminster election campaign capitalized on the hunger
strikes in which the government was seen as unyielding. Sinn Fein has
highlights state repression at every opportunity; the Stalker affair over
allegations of a shoot-to-kill policy by the RUC, the Emergency Provisions Act,
the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the scrapping of legislation which removes a
person's right to silence, the Diplock courts, the use of plastic bullets and
strip searching have all featured as election propaganda. More recently,
allegations of malpractice within the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR)
(investigated by the Stevens enquiry, which uncovered evidence of collusion,
especially the passing of intelligence on Republicans and passing of weapons
between the security forces and loyalist death squads) has provided Sinn Fein
with the necessary 'proof' of its partisan role. Young Catholics, frequently in
contact with UDR and British soldiers at vehicle check-points are driven into
the ranks of the Sinn Fein due to alleged harassment. In the age group 18-24,
Sinn Fein is over-represented in relations to its overall level of support
compared with an underrepresentation in the same cohort within the SDLP.
      The activities of the IRA also have a bearing on the level of Sinn Fein
support, favorable or otherwise. The killing of eight Provisional IRA members
en route to bomb a police station in Loughall in May 1987 and the September
1989 bombing of British soldier musicians at Deal in Kent, when 10 bandsmen
were killed and 22 people injured, cast the IRA in the role of political martyrs
and freedom fighters respectively. Sinn Fein can bask in the electoral glory of
such incidents. On other hand, the Enniskillen massacre of November 1987 and
a number of IRA 'mistakes' such as the November 1988 deaths of an Ulster
pensioner and his granddaughter by a bomb intended to destroy the Benburb
police station have damaged Sinn Fein at the polls. The equally repugnant
campaign by Loyalist assassination squads against those linked with Sinn Fein
or Republicans (solicitor Pat Finucane and Sinn Fein councillor John Davey
respectively) has also benefited the party electorally.
      The government has consciously played its part in creating conditions in
which the SDLP vote will increase, ideally at the expense of Sinn Fein. The
Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 provided a fillup for the SDLP and improved its
electoral support by remotivating its supporters. Recent investment plans for
Derry have been promoted as SDLP inspired initiatives with John Hume at the
forefront of the official announcement launch. A similar development in West
Belfast is unlikely to Sinn Fein MP Gerry Adams, in a similar role.
      In summary, it is impossible to single out any electoral impact the
legislative measures have had in the short term although the media ban may well
have consequences for Sinn Fein's ability to get its message across in the long
term and consolidate its electoral base. This begs the question what in fact was
the purpose of the measures--especially the broadcasting ban--beyond the self-
evident? One observer has argued that Northern Ireland has 'provided the
means by which the professional broadcasters have steadily been brought to the
government's heel." The much publicized conflict between the Thatcher
government and the media over coverage of the US raids on Libya, the Secret
Society affair, Gibraltar killings ("Death on the Rock" and "Real Lives"
documentaries) provided the momentum for the broadcasting ban in Northern
Ireland. Decisive action against Sinn Fein (and others) was a useful pretext for
establishing authority over the broadcasters and at the same time a spontaneous
reactions to an escalating campaign of violence by the IRA. The anti-violence
declaration, whilst linked with the latter, was offered as an olive branch to
dispirited Unionist councillors in the wake of a failed campaign of disruption
against the Anglo-irish Agreement and their opposition to Sinn Fein. Ministers
were constantly reminded of their hypocritical approach to Sinn Fein--on the
one hand refusing to meet the party;'s delegates but expecting  constitutional
parties to work with them in council chambers on the other. The anti-violence
declaration was a palliative for councillors who found Sinn Fein's presence in
councils anathema.
                                       
Conclusion

      The measures described must be seen in the context of a wider policy to
deal with terrorism and those who advocate and condone violence. Sinn Fein's
support for the armed struggle juxtaposed with an electoral strategy is based
on a notion that a political campaign is a  necessary component of a long-term
'anti-colonial war.' The repugnance felt by a majority of Nationalists at the
brutal acts of violence carried out on their behalf required a political response
which could rationalize murder and destruction as the only legitimate means of
securing 'national self-determination and the removal of the occupying British
forces'. Political activists liken their struggle to their struggle to conflicts in
South Africa, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories, in particular similarities in
the controversial role of the security forces, the operation of emergency laws
and instances of human rights violations. Sinn Fein has argued that
constitutional politics alone cannot secure its political objective, citing the
Anglo-Irish Agreement as a failed initiative which has not benefited
Nationalists.
      There are, however, convincing reasons why the dual approach of
violence and politics adopted by Sinn Fein is both incompatible and futile.
Wilkerson, in a general discussion on political violence, notes characteristics
which illustrate its inefficacy. Firstly, it is extremely difficult for its
perpetrators to control and the wrong targets may be hit. Secondly, the effects
of political violence--death, maiming and destruction--are irreversible. The
result is that 'reconciliation and compromise, the cement of normal politics,
becomes less and less attainable the longer political violence continues." Both of
these factors are apparent in Northern Ireland. One of the on-going tensions
between Sinn Fein and the IRA is the number of 'mistakes' which are made by
the IRA. An example in May 1990 involved the killing of two Australian tourists
in Holland, mistaken for British soldiers based at a nearby headquarters of the
British Army of the Rhine in Germany. This was by no means an isolated case.
Such fatal incidents damage the IRA and Sinn Fein even amongst their most
loyal supporters. It resulted in Gerry Adams unusually condemning the murders
of the two Australians as 'inexcusable and unjustifiable.' The incident also
highlighted the ongoing rift between Sinn Fein and the IRA and followed Adams
comments to the Provos in 1988 to get their house in order after a catalogue of
'mistakes'. Significantly, one week later Sinn Fein refused to condemn the
killing of a young army recruit at Litchfield railway station in England. On the
same day the UVF, the outlawed loyalist paramilitary organization, killed a
Catholic (Patrick Boyle) and injured his two sons by mistake in Annaghmore.
      Other tensions have emerged between the political and military
strategists. The high resource costs necessary for election campaigns and
community politics, which are a feature of Sinn Fein's day-to-day operation, are
seen as a huge financial drain. The opportunity cost is that resources spent on
political campaigns is money not available for 'volunteers', and energies are
diverted into fundaising, sometimes by dubious means. There is also some
criticism of the long-term prospects for Sinn Fein as a political party, bearing
in mind the restrictions resulting from the media ban. The last three elections
(1985 local, 1987 parliamentary and the 1989 local elections) have seen Sinn
Fein's support slowly decrease to just over 11 percent. This raises the question
as to whether the human and financial resource commitment to maintain this
level of political support is worthwhile and what happens if there is further
decline in the party's electoral appeal? Militarists would be unhappy to interpret
such a decrease in support for Sinn Fein as a veto on the armed struggle.
      Although the measures discussed were conceived in the aftermath of
increased IRA violence, their purpose and impact are difficult to disentangle
from wider issues of mollifying Unionists and moderating broadcasters. If the
purpose was to disenfranchise Sinn Fein and deny the party the opportunity to
communicate its political message, there is something disingenuous about this
approach having rejected proscription. Attempts to wean republican voters
away from Sinn Fein are more likely to succeed by economic and social
measures, the 'hearts and minds' strategy, than legislating the party out of
existence and creating further electoral anomalies in Northern Ireland.
                               **********


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