From zodiac@io.org Mon Jul 26 14:09:52 1993

In his letter in the pnews.d, Grover Furr challenges us to:

> Analyze the legacy of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and test it in
> reality. 

In the interest of analyzing the historical legacy of Stalin, let's
examine the Ukrainian famine of the early 1930s -- a product of his
mighty agrarian policy. 

The first document, for historical interest, is Stalin's official
version of the policy.  [_Pravda_, March 2, 1930.] The second document
is a transcript of a documentary produced here in Toronto, detailing the
genocidal massacre of _millions_ of people. 

Papa Joe at work, for the betterment of all...

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

                         "DIZZY WITH SUCCESS"

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

      Taken from the 13-volume Stalin collection entitled _Works_. 
      [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955.  Volume
      12, pp.197-205.]

      [My favorite part, and the most pertinent part, is "fact" 1. 
      The Russian and Ukrainian dictionaries must contain
      dialectically different definitions of what "voluntary"
      means...  kkc]

                                    *

The Soviet government's successes in the sphere of the collective-farm
movement are now being spoken of by everyone.  Even our enemies are
forced to admit that the successes are substantial.  And they really are
very great. 

It is a fact that by February 20 of this year, 50% of the peasant farms 
throughout the USSR had been collectivized.  that means that by February
20, 1930, we had _overfulfilled_ the five-year plan of collectivization
by more than 100%.

It is a fact that on February 28 of this year the collective farms had
_already succeeded_ in stocking upwards of 36,000,000 centers -- i.e.,
about 220,000,000 poods -- of seeds for the spring sowing, which is more
than 90% of the plan.  It must be admitted that the accumulation of
220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms alone -- after the
successful fulfillment of the grain-procurement plan -- is a tremendous
achievement.

What does all this mean?

That a _radical turn of the countryside towards socialism may be
considered as already achieved_.

There is no need to prove that these successes are of supreme importance
for the fate of our country, for the whole working class, which is the
directing force of our country, and, lastly, for the Party itself.  To
say nothing of the direct practical results, these successes are of
immense value for the internal life of the Party itself, for the
education of our Party.  They imbue our Party with a spirit of
cheerfulness and confidence in the victory of our cause.  They bring
forward additional millions of reserves for our Party.

Hence, the Party's task is: to _consolidate_ the successes achieved and
to _utilise_ them systematically for our further advancement. 

But successes have their seamy side, especially when they are attained
with comparative "ease" -- "unexpectedly", so to speak.  Such successes
sometimes induce a spirit of vanity and conceit: "We can achieve
anything!"  "There's nothing we can't do!"  People not infrequently
become intoxicated by such successes; they become dizzy with success,
lose all sense of proportion and the capacity to understand realities;
they show a tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate the
strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are made to solve all
questions of socialist construction "in a trice".  In such a case, there
is no room for concern to _consolidate_ the successes achieved and to
_utilize_ them systematically for further advancement.  Why should we
consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we can dash to the
full victory of socialism "in a trice": "We can achieve anything!"
"There's nothing we can't do!"

Hence, the Party's task is: to wage a determined struggle against these
sentiments, which are dangerous and harmful to our cause, and to drive
them out of the Party.

It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful sentiments are at all
widespread in the ranks of our Party.  But they do exist  in our Party,
and there are no grounds for asserting that they will not become
stronger.  And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can be no
doubt that the collective-farm movement will be considered weakened and
the danger of its breaking down may become a reality.

Hence, the task of our press is: systematically to denounce these and
similar anti-Leninist sentiments.

A few facts.

1.  The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other
things, to the fact that it rests on the _voluntary_character_ of the
collective-farm movement and on _taking into account the diversity of
conditions_ in the various regions of the USSR.  Collective farms must
not be established by force.  That would be foolish and reactionary. 
The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main
mass of the peasantry.  Examples of the formation of collective farms in
the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to
underdeveloped areas.  That would be foolish and reactionary.  Such a
"policy" would discredit the collectivization idea at one stroke.  In
determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful
consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the
various regions of the USSR.

Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in the collective-farm
movement.  Why is this?

Firstly, because in these areas we have the largest number of already
firmly-established state farms and collective farms, thanks to which the
peasants have had the opportunity to convince themselves of the power
and importance of the new technical equipment, of the power and
importance of the new, collective organization of farming.

Secondly, because these areas have had a two-years' schooling in the
fight against kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns, and this
could not but facilitate the development of the collective-farm
movement.

Lastly, because these areas in recent years have been extensively
supplied with the best cadres from the industrial centres.

Can it be said that these especially favorable conditions also exist in
other areas, the consuming areas, for example, such as our northern
regions, or in the areas where there are still backward nationalities,
such as Turkestan, say?

No, it cannot be said.

Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity of
conditions in the various regions of the USSR is, together with the
voluntary principle, one of the most important prerequisites for a sound
collective-farm movement.

But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said that the voluntary
principle and the principle of taking local peculiarities into account
are not violated in a number of areas? No, that cannot be said,
unfortunately.  We know, for example, that in a number of the northern
areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the immediate
organization of collective farms are comparatively less favorable than
in the grain-growing areas, attempts are not infrequently made to
_replace_ preparatory work for the organization of collective farms by
bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper
resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organization of
collective farms on paper -- collective farms which have as yet no
reality, but whose "existence" is proclaimed in a heap of boastful
resolutions. 

Or take certain areas of Turkestan, where conditions for the immediate
organization of collective farms are even less favorable than in the
northern regions of the consuming zone.  We know that in a number of
areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts to "overtake and
outstrip" the advanced areas of the USSR by threatening to use armed
force, by threatening that peasants who are not yet ready to join the
collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and manufactured
goods. 

What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev "policy"
and the Party's policy of relying on the voluntary principle and of
taking local peculiarities into account in collective-farm development?
Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common between them. 

Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the
collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants?
Nobody, except our enemies!

What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening our enemies and to
discrediting the idea of the collective-farm movement. 

Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, who imagine
themselves to be "Lefts", are in reality bringing grist to the mills of
Right opportunism?

2.  One of the greatest myths of our Party's political strategy is that
it is able at any given moment to pick out the _main link_ in the
movement, by grasping which the Party draws the whole chain towards one
common goal in order to achieve the solution to the problem.  Can it be
said that the Party has already picked out the main link of the
collective-farm movement in the system of collective-farm development?
Yes, this can should be said. 

What is this chief link?

Is it, perhaps, _association for joint cultivation_ of the land? No, it
is not that.  Association for joint cultivation of the land, in which
the means of production are not yet socialized, re already a past stage
of the collective-farm movement. 

Is it, perhaps, the _agricultural commune_? No, it is not that. 
Communes are still of isolated occurrence in the collective-farm
movement.  The conditions are not yet ripe for agricultural communes --
in which not only production, but also distribution is socialized -- to
be the _predominant_ form. 

The main link of the collective-farm movement, its _predominant_ form at
the present moment, the link which has to be grasped now, is the
_agricultural artel_. 

In the _agricultural artel_, the basic means of production, primarily
for grain-farming -- labor, the used of the land, machines, and other
implements, draught animals and farm buildings -- are socialized.  In
the artel, the household plots (small vegetable gardens, small
orchards), the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small
livestock, poultry, etc., are _not_socialized_. 

The artel is the _main link_ of the _collective-farm movement_ because
it is the form best adapted for solving the grain problem.  And the
grain problem is the _main link in the whole system of agriculture_
because, if it is not solved, it will be impossible to solve either the
problem of stock-breeding (small and large), or the problem of the
industrial and special crops that provide the principal raw materials
for industry.  that is why the agricultural artel is the main link in
the system of the collective-farm movement at the present movement. 

That is the point of departure of the "Model Rules" for collective
farms, the final text of which is published today. 

And that should be the point of departure of our Party and Soviet
workers, one of whose duties it is to make a thorough study of these
Rules and to carry them out down to the last detail. 

Such is the line of he Party at the present moment. 

Can it be said that this line of the Party is being carried out without
violation or distortion? No, it cannot, unfortunately.  We know that in
a number of areas of the USSR, where the struggle for the existence of
the collective farms is still far from over, and where artles are not
yet consolidated, attempts are being made to skip the artel framework
and to leap straight away into the agricultural commune.  The artel is
still not consolidated, but the they are "socializing" dwelling houses,
small livestock and poultry; moreover, this "socialization" is
degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing on paper, because the
conditions which would make such socialization necessary do not yet
exist.  One might think that the grain problem has already been solved
in the collective farms, that it is already a past stage, that the
principal task at the present moment is not solution of the grain
problem, but solution of the problem of livestock- and poultry-breeding. 
Who, we may ask, benefits from this blockheaded "work" of lumping
together different forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits
from this running too far ahead.  which is stupid and harmful to our
cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by "socializing" dwelling
houses.  all dairy cattle, all small livestock and poultry, when the
grain problem is still _unsolved_, when the artel form of collective
farming is _not yet consolidated_ -- is it not obvious that such a
"policy" can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our sworn
enemies?

One such overzealous "socializer" even goes so far as to issue an order
to an artel containing the instructions: "within three days, register
all poultry of every household", establish posts of special "commanders"
for registration and supervision; "occupy the key positions in the
artel"; "command the socialist battle without quitting your posts" and
-- of course -- get a tight grip on the whole life of the artel. 

What is this -- a policy of directing the collective farms, or a policy
of _disrupting_ and _discrediting_ them?

I say nothing of those "revolutionaries" -- save the mark! -- who
_begin_ the work of organizing artels by removing the bells from the
churches.  Just imagine, removing the church bells -- how
r-r-revolutionary!

How could there have arisen in our midst such blockheaded exercises in
"socialization", such ludicrous attempts to overleap oneself, attempts
which aim at bypassing classes and the class struggle, and which in fact
bring grist to the mill of our class enemies?

They could have arisen only because some of our comrades have become
dizzy with success and for the moment have lost clearness of mind and
sobriety of vision. 

To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-farm
development, _we must put an end to these sentiments_. 

_That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party_. 

The art of leadership is a serious matter.  One must not lag behind the
movement, because to do so is to lose contact with the masses.  But
neither must one run too far ahead, because to run too far ahead is to
lose the masses and to isolate oneself.  He who wants to lead a movement
and at the same time keep in touch with the vast masses must wage a
fight on two fronts -- against those who lag behind and against those
who run too far ahead. 

Our Party is strong and invincible because, when leading a movement, it
is able to preserve and multiply its contacts with the vast majority of
the workers and peasants. 

-30-