Statement From ERNK European Representative Semsi Kilic

[The following is a statement by one of the ERNK's European
Representatives, Semsi Kilic, to MED-TV regarding the
kidnapping of PKK Chairman Abdullah Ocalan from Kenya.]

     The PKK leader left Italy on January 16, 1999, based on the
negotiations and agreements with the Italian government. For
days, we held discussions with representatives sent directly by
D'Alema on the future [of our leader]. Certain decisions were
reached then. They were working on the issue of how Italy could
find a third country where our leader would have a chance to
stay. D'Alema and the Italian government made promises. However,
at this point our leader did not want to exert any more pressure
and stretch the kindness and hospitality of the Italian
government and people. Considering the possibility of a collapse
of the Italian government, our leader changed his mind. He
decided to leave Italy for a while to allow the legal process
regarding his asylum to take place in an amiable atmosphere. He
hoped that the [Kurdish] initiative [to find a peaceful,
political solution to the Kurdish question] set in motion among
the member nations of the European Union following his arrival to
Europe would proceed in a more receptive manner.
     Our leader went to Russia on January 16, 1999. He was
planning to return to Europe after a short stay in Russia and go
to Holland. He wanted to appeal to the International Court of
Justice to expose the genocide of the Turkish state in Kurdistan.
He wanted to reveal the true nature of the Turkish state. His
search was continuing. Until January 29, 1999, our leader stayed
in Moscow. On January 29, our leader left for Athens in order to
return to Europe. Negotiations resumed with authorities in
Athens. As you can guess, these talks were held initially with
the Greek Prime Minister Simitis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Pangolos, the Minister of Internal Affairs Papolopulos, and the
Public Minister and the Chief of the Intelligence. Given this and
other negotiations conducted with the knowledge of these
personalities, trusting our long work in Athens, we considered
them to be of help in international relations to promote the
right of the Kurds for self-determination.
     I would like to stress that I do not blame the Greek
government as a whole, but name only certain individuals for
participating in this international conspiracy. However for us,
as time passed, as the events unfolded, the details of both the
direct participation of these Greek personalities in the
conspiracy spearheaded by Turkey, the CIA, and the Mossad, and
their provision of intelligence to the above, became clearer.
     Until the January 30, 1999, these authorities made promises,
as usual, to provide "guarantees" to our leader. They were always
positive. They said they could do many things, but that they
needed time. [For example], they guaranteed that they would
mobilize the world public opinion and the European Union. It was
on the guaranties of these [Greek] circles that our leader
decided to go and stay for a certain period of time in another
[European] country. Later on, he would return to [Italy, Greece,
or Holland] from this temporary shelter to continue his European
mission. The Greek authorities, the Greek government made another
promise: To accept our leader's asylum request in Greece, but
that they would need time for this, albeit brief.
     We flew to Minsk with the plane the [Greek] authorities
provided. Another plane was supposed to pick up our leader and
his companions from that airport and fly us to The Hague.
Hundreds of Kurds had gathered at the airport the day our leader
was expected in The Hague, as friends, patriots, and our people
will remember. We were following these developments very closely.
However, when we arrived in Minsk we saw that there was no such
plane waiting for us. In fact, there was no such plane at all. We
were stuck at the airport for seven hours. They made us wait this
long in a plane with no heating in subzero [-20 C]
temperatures. [The plotters and the collaborators] wanted to
force us out of the plane into the passenger terminal. I would
like to reveal to our people and to the international community
[this piece of information] also: The crew of the plane received
an order during that waiting. It was directly from the office of
Pangalos. Of course, it is Simitis who was giving the orders. He
wanted the crew to dump us there and return. They had closed all
the doors except one. That must have been part of the agreement.
     The fact that the plane to The Hague was not there shows
this: [The Greek authorities] were hands in glove with the CIA,
the Mossad, and the Turkish Republic. We refused to get out. So,
they were forced to take us back to Athens. We landed in Athens
on January 31, 1999. Hurriedly they packed us off to the island
of Kolfo [Corfu] and put us there. And then came the meetings and
the talks resumed. They wanted our leader to leave. On the other
hand they were afraid of expelling him openly or abandoning him
conspicuously. They feared the reaction of their own people. They
feared the strong friendship and the common fate between the
Greek and Kurdish people. Since they were obliged to work in a
planned, programmed manner [more meticulously], they resumed the
meetings yet one more time. Pangalos sent a message to our
leader. That he would meet our leader personally. That he would
wait for our leader at a certain place. He said that he was ready
to implement the requirements of the international law, that he
was going to do it legally. He was saying: "Welcome. I am very
glad to see you, to accept you in Greece, in the name of the
Greeks."
     What followed was this: Instead of himself, he sent his
Chief of Intelligence, Savrakakis. The insincerity of this
personality, his shallowness, was manifest. After hours of talks,
once again, for a limited time, Chairman Ocalan was to be sent to
"a place". And shortly after, he would be readmitted [into
Greece], of course when the ground was prepared. This was the
guarantee given by Simitis and Pangalos which we passed to our
leader. Once more, preparations for a flight began in Kolfo
[Corfu]. On the way to the plane we had an "accident". The wing
of the airplane suddenly impaled through the front window of the
military vehicle that was taking us to the plane, nearly killing
our leader who was sitting in the front row. I think this was
done on purpose, this was planned. They wanted to eliminate our
leader in an "accident" like this having failed to turn him in to
the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey [MIT] the first
or the second time. Simitis and Pangalos are directly responsible
for this [accident]. Some of the confidants who were with our
leader and some of our friends were wounded in their hands and
faces. We barely managed to get our leader out of the car. Again,
we had to wait for another plane. When that plane came, we did
not know exactly where we would be going. There was only talk of
Africa, but we had no idea as to which country in Africa we would
fly. The plane was finally ready. A new journey started for us.
The plane landed in Nairobi, Kenya on February 1, 1999. Even our
leader did not know we would land there. I think the most
dominant thought [the likeliest speculation] was that our leader
would stay in South Africa during this new [waiting] phase. Our
speculations concentrated on South Africa. But unfortunately, as
their plan requested, the plane was brought to Kenya. We were
taken to the residency of the Greek Ambassador. And until the
last moment, we stayed in that house. This is what they told to
our leader: "You will stay here for two months. You won't have
any problems here. After the two months, when we complete the
arrangements, you can go to South Africa. Because South Africa
looks warmly to this issue. We are pursuing the matters on our
own. Talks with South Africa via Greece are continuing. Shortly
after we arrange your [staying] place, your passage to there will
be accomplished. However, there was a wide gap between what was
said and what was done. The day after our arrival in Nairobi,
the Greek state officials intensified the pressure on the
Ambassador. They were demanding a single thing: Immediately to
take our leader away from the house of the Ambassador and put him
up in another place. For safety purposes, they proposed that he
should stay at a church or a farmhouse because no one would
suspect until the day of departure, whereas at the Ambassador's
residence he would attract attention. Carefully and with great
foresight, the leader of our party analyzed this seemingly
logical proposal and decided not to leave this place. Of course,
the MIT, the CIA, and the Mossad were preparing themselves during
this time, as we follow the course of the developments now.
Through their agents sent to Kenya way before our arrival, the
house we were in, the neighborhood, the Greek Embassy was under
total surveillance. They were video taping and taking pictures at
all times. Naturally, we were not absolutely sure of this. But we
could guess it. And we wondered how it all was going to end. Were
we at the end of our journey, we wondered? We focused and
concentrated [on what could be done]. During this period, our
leader met with his Italian lawyer. And his lawyer from Greece
met him here and filled another request form for asylum in
Greece. During this time, we observed that, both his lawyer from
Italy and the one from Greece were stopped at the airport. Thus
from the first day, we knew this fact very well: They knew where
we were. Our leader would say: "They know where we are, why do
they keep so quiet?" We speculated more or less that they were
quiet due to the negotiations that began with Greece at that
time. However, that was not the case as we can see now, because
they [the kidnappers] were preparing themselves at different
levels. Even though last week until Friday [February 12, 1999]
was a time of intense disputes, the following days the pressure
intensified wildly. We had entered into a very hard period. On
Friday, the Kenyan authorities summoned the Ambassador to their
office. The Ambassador claimed that he was sick and could not go
see them that day. So it dragged to Monday. But we were aware of
the developments outside as a result of what we heard from
here and there. Something must have been hatching inside the
Embassy. Among the personnel, in telephone conversations, huge
disputes would break out. We felt the danger even stronger at
those moments. We passed this information to our leader. It
became apparent that four Greek policemen had arrived to Nairobi
sent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the order of
Pangalos - seemingly to provide more security - but in fact,
commissioned to anesthetize and abduct our leader. Our leader met
with them. He enumerated the negative outcomes of such an effort.
He requested that this work [the abduction scheme] be stopped at
once since it would sow the never ending seeds of enmity among
peoples. He invited them to be more rational and show greater
sensitivity. As soon as this plot was unearthed, Pangalos was
forced to recall his policemen. We met with these policemen here
through our confidants [foreign friends]. They personally did not
know the exact purpose of their mission. They said that they
would "never think of betraying either their own people or the
Kurdish people". They quickly departed. At Nairobi Airport, I
think they were detained for 24 hours. Saturday and Sunday we and
our leader went trough truly hard times. I think it was Sunday
afternoon, again, the officials came and said that things had
returned to normal; that Pangalos had sent a message and said
that he would do all that international law promised, adding
another lie to his previous ones.
     Monday [February 15, 1999] was a black stain for us, for the
Kurds in Turkey, for the whole Kurdish nation, for the Greeks
- as they have acknowledged - and for humanity. The Greek
Ambassador met with Kenyan officials in the morning and came back
full of promises. The Greek government played a prominent role in
the presentation of these promises. They told us that they [the
Greek officials] had met among themselves earlier and decided to
send the Chairman of our party to a European country of his own
choosing. And they said that the work for these arrangements had
started. Interestingly enough, they told us that they would also
allow the Ambassador to go with us as a guarantee of their own
sincerity.
     The same day, they [the Greek officials told] us that
everything was ready and we would be leaving at 5:30 p.m. and
that the airplane was waiting at the airport. Since two of us
were away [from the residency], our Chairman refused to leave
until we came back and wanted them to wait a bit. When we came
back, we saw that the Nairobi police and the intelligence units
of the Ministry of the Interior of Kenya were waiting in five
cars outside the Ambassador's residence. They were waiting for
us. Our Chairman was ready. He told us to get ready for we had to
leave immediately. We had a serious argument here. We wanted to
tell them [the Kenyan police and intelligence units] that we
would not leave. We told them we did not want to fall into this
trap and we knew where they were taking us. We told them that we
had no trust on this whole thing. Let me tell you why we said
this. We had talked on the phone to a so-called [Greek] friend
who was carrying out some work for our Chairman just before
returning to the residency of the Ambassador. The so-called
friend told me that everything was ready, that we should not be
worrying about anything, that we could depart today. His
approach, the [harsh] voices we heard in the background [telling
him what to say] rather disturbed us. We told him to relate to
the officials with him right away that we were not leaving the
residency, and that we did not want to fall into the trap these
officials had set up.
     We turned our telephones off and returned home. Even though
we had collected some information [confirming our fears], since
we ourselves were not very sure and lacked the opportunities
[necessary resources] there was nothing we could do. And this is
precisely how our situation was in that house. We told them [the
Kenyan authorities] that we would not leave the house. Our party
leader was telling us that we were given the guarantee, we should
not be emotional on this issue and we had to leave the house. We
strongly insisted [on not leaving], we argued for more than half
an hour. We wanted him to go in the Greek Ambassador's car. To a
great extent, the Greek Ambassador was also in agreement with us.
As is known, the Ambassador's car, like his home, has immunity.
Mr. Ocalan also would have a chance, as long as he was in this
car, to get away. One could not say [he would have] a one
hundred percent chance, but some [chance] due to [diplomatic]
immunity. Also, in an Ambassador's car one could move with
greater ease [in traffic]. We realized then and there that [the
Kenyans] would never allow our party leader to go in the
Ambassador's car. They said that they had prepared a special car,
that it would be safer to travel in [their] car. The Greek
Ambassador resisted them for a long time. However, in the end
[the Kenyans won], arguing that they had to take our leader in
their own car, that that was the agreement [with the Pangalos
government?]. They put our party leader into their own car. We
went to the same car and wanted to ride with our party leader.
They did not allow any one of us to ride with him. They said that
was the decision according to the agreement. Exactly at that
moment, a message was received from Pangalos' office. It said
that we would be taken to any [a] European country, that talks
with the government [of that country] were held, guarantees
[clearance] obtained, and that there was no problem. He could
move. After this guarantee, the party leader said we could set
off on our journey now. We could go. To tell you the truth, it
was hard to read the feelings of the party leader at that moment.
However, let me state this: From our observations and reading of
the situation, and having known the party leader, [I could see
that] he had sensed most of the things [the turn of the events].
We had told him that [this journey] could end up in Ankara, that
this could be a plot. He said personally also that this was the
last step of the conspiracy. Our opinion was that the moment we
left the building, the Chairman's journey might end up in Ankara,
that we should never leave. The party leader said this: "Even if
we stay, if they [the conspirators] have such a plan
[preparation], as these guys [Kenyans, Greeks] also said, they
will finish us off tonight." "They will definitely do this" he
said. With foresight, our party leader had in fact seen most of
the developments that came. Our Chairman became very well aware
of [the trap] that the Greek representatives such as Simitis and
Pangalos and some others [had set up]; and what the guarantees
[they gave, meant] and [why] Simitis and Pangalos were trying
constantly to calm [us] through direct phone calls and [saying]
that everything would be alright. The leader was aware of this
charade. That is why he continuously struggled to calm down the
four of us who were protesting and constantly trying to prevent
him [from leaving]. He struggled for more than one hour trying to
calm us down. He was aware of it. Because we had stayed with him
for days and days we had wondered if this were the last leg
of the conspiracy. [As time passed], the forces that were
involved in the plot became more and more apparent, they are
becoming more and more visible. No one wished for this, of
course.
     Before departure, they told us that we would go in a convoy,
although none of us believed it much. As soon as the party leader
climbed into the car, before we had a chance to go in our car,
they sped off and all cars got separated from each other. When
our car arrived at the airport, we saw the party leader in his
car. We moved behind his car and came to a stop in front of a
door which had "the police" inscribed on it. All at once,
policemen came running toward us from all directions. They
surrounded the car of the party leader, turned it around, and
spirited it away. We could neither get out of the car nor move
it because the place was packed with policemen. Three policemen
accompanied our party leader in his car. They [other policemen]
took us inside the international airport and dropped us there.
They dropped the Greek Ambassador's car somewhere else. This was
[a manoeuvre to disperse us] so that for a long time we would
not be able find and join each other. However, we ran where we
had seen him last. But it was too late. He was nowhere to be
seen. With the Ambassador, we returned to where we had left our
friends. The Ambassador was calling and trying to get hold of
various circles, but interestingly enough, he was not able to get
ahold of anyone. Only once, he was able to get ahold of
Pangalos. We stuck close by and listened to understand. Pangalos
ordered him "to abandon those around him [i.e. us] there and
disappear". But the Ambassador did not abandon us there. We
stayed there for a while and tried to find something out. Then
we returned to the Embassy.
     Those who participated in this international conspiracy
against our party's leadership, collaborating with Israel, the
Mossad, the CIA, and Kenya, wanted to eliminate every one of us
as well after shipping our leader to Turkey, in order to get rid of
eyewitnesses. They wanted to leave the four of us to the mercy of
the Kenyan police or to the Mafia or to whichever forces to
shroud this event in total mystery and silence. But they failed.
One of the policemen who returned to Greece made a public
statement as soon as he returned. He stated that he was sent [to
Kenya] by his government and he was supposed to anesthetize Mr.
Ocalan and drop him at a certain place so that the Turkish
National Intelligence Organization [MIT] could come and pick him up.
He stated that he was ashamed to become part of an undertaking of
this sort, but that he was not a traitor. He would not betray
either the Kurdish or his own people. This was a person [the
Greek police] who belonged to the intelligence service of Greece
and had been accompanying Mr. Ocalan for some time now [Uzun
Zaman?]. No one wanted to be a partner in this game that the,
which I call, "GLADIO segments" of the Pangalos, Simitis
government. [Pangalos and some in his government] are with the
GLADIO that carries out such international operations. Our leader
was kidnapped in this way and handed to the Turkish state. It is
interesting to note that [even during these developments]
Papadapoulos unceasingly tried to eliminate the eyewitnesses and
to curb them from coming into Greece. All of Pangalos' messages,
his directives [to the Embassy authorities], as far as we can
read the situation, are in the direction of eliminating
eyewitnesses like us. We hear this, we feel this from around. At
all costs, Pangalos wants to eliminate us and not to send us
anywhere else. Because the eyewitnesses have a lot to tell. The
Greek Ambassador here is preparing to leave, the Kenyan
government is putting constant pressure to force him out. Those
who participated in this plot should be condemned by the Greek
people and by the world public opinion. Our people must know
these details. However, knowing these facts should never lead to
violence. We must take this into consideration. The latest talks,
the latest views of our leader was to transform the PKK, to
transform the national liberation struggle in Kurdistan, in all
its greatness, with all its power, into a political movement. All
of his efforts were in this direction. This last trip was going
to be to Holland, he was going to the court in The Hague and, with
a great trial, expose the Turkish state, expose the crimes of the
Turkish state. Even though he knew that this last trip might very
well be the last leg that concluded the international conspiracy.
He had messages to Germany. He wanted the German government to
stop its 15-year-old criminalization policy towards our people.
He wanted Europe to see that European efforts to label and
prosecute the PKK as a terrorist group was at the bottom [of the
violence]. Germany was leading such efforts and that Germany
should review its criminalization policies. That Germany should
be more sensitive, more constructive in its messages to the
movement. He even was saying this during the last days: "Since
the German government wants to try me, since it claims that it
has incriminating documents, we will go to Germany. We would like
to see how the German government will put us on trial, how the
trial would end. We would like to prove the innocence of
ourselves, our people, and our party." Our leader was serious
about going to Germany, to be part of such a trial, such an
educational opportunity. We did an investigation of this. We
talked with our lawyers for hours. We sent messages to our
lawyers in Holland about this matter. Our leader was ready for
such a court, for such judicial processes, because he believed
that with it, all truths would come out. He surely was ready for
this.

Host Suna Canan: OK, I would like to go back to the last day, to
the day when Mr. Ocalan was kidnapped in that collaborative
manner with the Turkish state. You said that you talked to a
friend and the friend told you that everything was OK and there
was nothing to worry about. Can you tell us, if at all possible,
who this friend was?

     Surely, we will reveal the identity of such friends, these
circles that we called friends. I don't know his family name, but
his first name was Andonis. He was a businessman. He travels with
a diplomatic pass. He deals with trade in these countries. He
should be accountable for the things he told us. He also should
go public and tell his people as to what really happened. He must
tell the world public how he was part of this betrayal. There are
others who refused to become part of this plot. They stood with
us. And they tried their best not to be part of this betrayal.
Even if it cost them their lives, they refused to become part of
such betrayal.

Host Suna Canan: OK, [as you know], Kenya is a place where the
Mossad and the CIA abound and move freely. Especially after the
bombings of 1998 in Kenya, more U.S. intelligence units were
placed there. The U.S. made a public statement recently to the
effect that it did not directly participate in the kidnapping of
Mr. Ocalan to Turkey. How do you evaluate the role of the U.S. in
this plot? If I am not mistaken, the U.S. and Greek officials
were holding talks a few days before the PKK Chairman went to
Kenya. What do you have to say on this subject?

     The U.S. government claims that there was no direct
involvement. This may be true, but there is an indirect
involvement through the CIA. The U.S. acknowledges involvement
through mobilization of its intelligence services in
collaboration of the Turkish government. The U.S. is indeed in
the thick of this. Israel is also heavily involved in this
operation.
     [Greece or Kenya] is under their control. And through their
collaboration this project succeeded. I remember the statements
of the Press Secretary and Government Spokesman of Greece. They
all aimed to eject our leader from the Embassy. Pangalos'
pressures were increasing. The Pangalos government lied that Mr.
Ocalan left the Embassy on his own initiative. This is a lie.
They propagated such a lie in order to absolve themselves in the
eye of the public. This was not true at all. If it need be, the
content of negotiations [with Mr. Ocalan] can be released by
those who took part in them. There is data, evidence in this
area. There are also taped telephone conversations. When these
are revealed, people would be able to see the truth. Some states
will see how they were deceived. They will see how meaningless,
how unjust it was to deceive us, to deceive the Kurdish people.
Greek authorities claim that our Chairman left the premises on
his own. This is not true. They are trying to cover up the trail.
This is our opinion.

Host Suna Canan: Is there anything you want to add?

     The three friends here would like to say a single thing. Our
leader gave us immensely important duties. We have to work very
hard. We will say that not to betray the trust he had in us, not
to waste the labor he put in to educate us, we will do all we
can. We will intensify our work. We were with him all the time
and our leader will live in us all the time. For our people, for
our national liberation struggle, we will give all we have. We
know the expectations of our Chairman and we have told these to
our comrades. We will strive to be worthy of those expectations.
We will mobilize all of our energy to be worthy of our people.

(Source: Kurdistan Informatie Centrum/Med-TV)