"We Are Developing A Democratic Approach"

Interview With ARGK Commander Duran Kalkan 

[Kurdish Media has translated an important interview with
Duran Kalkan, a commander of the ARGK and a member of
the PKK's Presidential Council, published in the July 15,
1999 issue of 'Ozgur Politika', a Kurdish daily
published in Europe.]

Q: How do you evaluate the reactions to the death sentence issued
at the Trial of the Century?

Duran Kalkan: The period we've just left behind was a time for
surfacing of the reactions. Therefore, we did not want to make
any statements to interfere with these reactions. Above all, the
court sentence is a procedural one. It was not a surprise
sentence. Given the current laws, it was the most likely
sentence. A different sentence would have been a weak
possibility. As Suleyman Demirel stated also, this phase, which
was essentially circumscribed by existing laws, which did not
have much weight in regards to the overall issue, is now
completed. There are other procedures to come. The problem is, in
its essence, not a judicial problem, it is a political one. The
decision has also to be political. Demirel too has stated it in
these terms, he stated it correctly. In this sense, the decision
has not been made yet. It will be made, through debates and
discussions during the coming period.
     Even when judicial procedures were in progress, a detailed
political debate took place. This was inevitable due to the
nature of the trial. After the court announced its decision,
these debates became more intense. Perhaps, Turkey's atmosphere
could not take it, the authorities wanted to reduce the
intensity of the debates and put the issue on the back burner.
The Prime Minister himself did it. That is why other issues are
brought forth into the agenda. However, no matter what, the issue
has made its entry into the agenda of discussions in Turkey with
a weight. It has become part of discussion. Various circles have
discussed the issue, they were forced to discuss it. Some even
stated that they should not discuss the issue while in fact
they were discussing it. To discuss or not to discuss the issue
became debated. Those who said it should not be discussed were
forced to discuss the issue. Some stated that Chairman Apo's
plight should be combined with the Kurdish issue, others wanted
the two issue separated. However, even during these arguments on
separating issues such as the Kurdish issue, the plight of the
people in Kurdistan, and with it they had to discuss the domestic
and international situation of Turkey. This shows that the issue,
essentially, due to its political nature also, has not only
occupied the first place on the agenda in Turkey, but also
determined all of it. And this created a response. The statements
of Chairman Apo and his messages have influenced the atmosphere
in Turkey. He is very effective. He influenced everyone, those
who agreed with him, as well as those who did not. All circles
ranging from political ones to the press, from economic circles
to all of the others, and segments of people, reacted, expressed
views, and they still do.

Q: Widespread actions took place almost everywhere and in the
Kurdish diaspora following the sentence. What is the degree of
impact of these mass actions on the process?

     Everyone can see that even actions that express a reserved
reaction [from the Kurdish side] shake the situation in Turkey
excessively, extremely. Such actions represent a deliberate show
of tamed reactions. Our party, our army, and our people possess a
very advanced potential and organization in this respect. Now,
the reactions of the past 15 days should be seen as a
demonstrative sample of what would come if that readiness is
mobilized and put into action fully. If those who insist on
carrying out the sentence given at the Imrali trial wonder
what could happen, they should look at the actions of these last
15 days at least and it won't be hard to guess. Our responses
are sort of very measured, very delicate, and contain a careful
approach in order not to destroy the last bit of positiveness
that might be there. Imagine how very differently we would react
if the situation changes. It is very useful that everyone should
understand it this way. They should get the gist of the message
and desist, since doing so would personally benefit those who
will make the decision.

Q: Turkish officials are indecisive.

     It is natural. Obviously, it is them who will ponder and
decide. We are developing a democratic approach; it might be
liked, disliked, or critiqued. This is the nature of the process.
In this regard, we feel partly that there is an improving and
maturing approach. In almost all segments there are
representatives of such mature approaches. This change is, in
a way, a sign that the coming phase could take a positive turn.
Actually, there are such signs. One can see them easily. However,
they are not exactly dominant or manifest. They have to be more
manifest and dominant so that the process advances in the right
direction. The prolongation of the current ambiguity is
obviously damaging. Very many adverse events, unwanted events,
events that tax the public opinion take place because this
process of clarification is not allowed to work its course [in
Turkey]. If it is delayed any longer, many more unwanted events
will take place. The ones in charge, the ones in responsible
positions, should not prolong this situation.

Q: Among those who reacted to the verdict were organizations,
parties, and institutions from Kurdistan. Do you think their
response was satisfactory?

     Our forces in struggle, our people's forces, were incensed
by the verdict and responded. This is how they manifested their
outrage. Of course, we wish that the other organizations and forces
in Kurdistan had reacted on a par. From different parts of
Kurdistan and from friendly organizations we have received
statements of support. The verdict was denounced. They announced
their objections to the sentence. However, such responses were
rather limited. They were confined to specific circles. Very many
forces did not respond. Very many organizations said nothing,
especially those that have advertised themselves as "Kurdistani"
for so long and those that have even claimed to have led the
Kurdish struggle. Some organizations even issued statements to
the contrary. As if they were disturbed that the problem was
being discussed. Both in Northern Kurdistan and Southern
Kurdistan there were such organizations. Very many of them simply
said nothing. It is hard to understand why Kurdish organizations
that have called themselves the political representatives of the
Kurds remained mute especially at a time when in Northern
Kurdistan, in Turkey, and globally people were talking about the
Kurdish problem. This is truly shameful. It shows how alienated
they are from life and reality. This also illustrates succinctly
why the Kurdish issue has not been solved for decades. Also, this
says a lot about their capacity as representatives in search of a
solution to Kurdish question. Naturally, where there are such
organizations, there is no solution to the Kurdish problem.
Theirs was a very backward stand. After all, the whole world and
circles sympathetic to the Kurds all opposed the sentence. One
wonders, was it that they ran out of words to denounce this
sentence which concerns the national existence and future of the
Kurds? Would it have put them under a heavy obligation had they
expressed their opposition to the death penalty?
     Their attitudes are truly shameful. One cannot understand
them. First of all, our people and everyone else see this
contrast very well and get to know these organizations very
well. Everyone sees clearly who obstructs or stops national unity
and progress. Naturally, our people will increasingly adopt a
stance against such indifference. We hope that such Kurdish
circles give up their aloofness and get ready to enter, at
least, in a national and humanitarian framework.

Q: After the sentence, many issued statements in Europe and in
various countries that the sentence should be commuted. How do
you evaluate this response from public opinion abroad?

     Europe has a very great responsibility in what happened. The
trial process also unearthed the attitude of Europe very starkly.
We see now very well how Europe approaches the Kurdish question
and how "determined" it is to find a solution. It became clear
that it is "a very new approach". Instead of finding a solution
to the Kurdish problem, Europe's approach is confined to some
very narrow, simple economic interests that center around
snatching away from Turkey a few business contracts. It became
very clear that Europe does not have a political approach that
supersedes its economic interests. When this became exposed
during the court proceedings, Europe wanted naturally to show
some sort of a reaction. They wanted to delay the trial. Our
Chairman grasped this situation well; he exposed this approach of
the above powers and reminded them their obligations and pulled
them into the process. In this sense, they [the Europeans] were
affected intensely by the trial. They realized that they could
not stay on the sidelines of this problem, that they could not
extract themselves out of this problem. Therefore, as the trial
proceeded to an end, when it reached a decision, they scrambled
to adopt an approach that befitted the verdict. This is very
basic. It is absolutely not enough. However, it seems that they
are inclined to overcome this situation that is non-conducive to
any solution, that leaves them no initiative, and renders them
powerless. This is true for the whole of Europe, for the European
Union, for individual European countries and states. In a sense,
Europe is going perhaps through a change in its approach to the
problem. It could be said that Europe is moving away from an
approach that was centered around a very narrow, simple economic
interest, to a political approach that takes into account the
problems of Turkey, that of the Kurds, and the region. Of course,
at this point, these are clues only. How far could it [this
European approach] go and who would push the button are not
clear. However, this turn is inevitable and it is clear that the
problems cannot be managed with the old simple approaches. The
leader of our party has delineated this very well. We believe and
hope that certain circles also grasp it better. This is the
situation in general. However, we know very well that Germany has
a heavy responsibility. Germans know it, our people know it also.
And everyone else should know it, too. Germany has a heavy
responsibility for the process [Ocalan leaving Europe] taking a
turn like this [his capture] and lack of a solution [to the
Kurdish question] prior to all of these developments. Germany
should remember this and develop a fitting approach. This is so,
both for its own interests and due to the responsibility it
bears. We are closely following Germany's attitude. Its old
stance is not acceptable.

Q: The Italian government still holds onto its policies from the
time PKK Chairman Abdullah Ocalan came to Rome.

     Italy has made some efforts. We hope they will intensify
those efforts. The leadership of our party has established an
environment of friendship in Italy. He also received friendship.
Our leader acknowledged this verbally; he thanked the Italians
when he was there. He has friends both among the officials and
among the people. This is the foundation from which the Italian
position springs forth. This is good and respectable. At least,
it is harmonious with their principles. They are in synch. We
hope that they go much further. We hope they decide to give
asylum to our leader and finalize that decision. We hope that in
the international arena and in Europe they take the initiative
to promote a solution. This is beneficial for them and for our
friendship. Of course, there are other powers. As a power
responsible for this affair, the U.S. has a position and a
reaction. The U.S. is also responsible for the solution. From the
past onwards, it has had an approach that goes beyond the
confines of narrow interests. The U.S. approaches the Kurdish
question in Turkey within a framework that encompasses a system
of wider interests. This is a comprehensive approach. Due to
this approach, the U.S. is intimately involved with the problem.
The U.S. is also leading the fight against us. Everyone knows
this. We all know it. It played also the lead role in the last
international plot [the kidnapping of Mr. Ocalan from Kenya].
Actually, the U.S. responses, too, reflect its role in the
plot. It did not behave like the others that were involved [i.e.
did not put on a pretentious face]. However, the U.S. has not
been able to initiate a fruitful process of solving the
problem. It is mistaken on the issues of how and where the
problem is going to be solved. The U.S. has not found and held
onto the forces that could bring a solution. The forces that U.S.
deems capable of solving the problem fail to do so. That is why
the U.S. is in such a weak position. While searching for a
solution, it ends up with none. As long as the U.S. insists on
its current approach in the region, the success it obtained in
other parts of the world will elude it in this area. The Kurdish
question continues to play the key role for success in
this sense. Everyone and we, too, know very well the extent of
the U.S. responsibility and involvement. Given this, we hope the
U.S. does and will see the reality better. We hope it will
gradually adopt a more realistic approach, taking into
consideration the realities of the region and in its search for a
solution to Kurdish question, and considering the plight of the
Kurdish people in Turkey, too. If the U.S. pays attention to
these factors, it will produce solutions. If not, it will fail to
take successful steps in the region and will be ineffective.

Q: In addition to debates on the possibility of the PKK splitting
up or the war intensifying if the sentence is carried out, there
is also the ongoing operations of the Turkish army in both
Northern and Southern Kurdistan. Are these operations related to
the verdict and trial?

     As I have stated above, the final decision has not been
made yet. We don't see the court sentence as a finality. However,
Turkey is undoubtedly in a process of making up its mind. This
decision is one of those rare ones that come up once in every
several centuries or so. It is not an easy process. The final
decision is going to be made during the period that is ahead of
us and will be implemented step by step. We hope the decision
is such that benefits the people and society in Turkey. We hope
it leads to mutual progress on the basis of Kurdish-Turkish peace
and Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood and brotherhood with other
peoples based on solidarity. This is right and in the interest of
everyone. As such, the sentence is wrong and we find it still
early to say anything definite. In fact, one should not even talk
about it, it does not make much sense. It will bring no good to
anyone. The fear that Turkey will "split up and be divided" are
farfetched, unrealistic. Of course, there would always be those
pursuing small self-interests making a lot of noise. They may
demand separation, this and that. They should not be a problem.
You would find them among the Turks and among us, too. However,
this is not the root cause of the problem. The essence of the
problem is different. Everyone must see that the change that
occurred among the Kurds is permanent. Especially, the powers
that be must see it better than anybody else. The PKK must be
understood in this light. This [the change among the Kurds] is a
structural change, a social phenomenon. No doubt this happened
through the efforts of our party leadership, and those of our
militants. However, it was also an evolutionary process and a
natural one. The change and consciousness was an expression of
economic, social, and political developments. They emerged
through such an evolution. Now, it would be shallow to ignore
such developments and view the Kurdish movement divorced from
this reality, as if it emerged in a vacuum, and fantasize that it
would crumble and vanish overnight if attacked. It would be an
approach devoid of facts and scientific verification. It is clear
why one should abstain from such an outlook. Again, it is very
clear why one should stay away from these stereotyped and
dogmatic approaches/stands. We are striving to overcome such
approaches. We want what is in the interests of the people
everywhere.
     There has been no significant increase in Turkish military
activity following the sentence in comparison to the previous
times. We have said nothing about this so far, but let me divulge
to you a thing or two: What the military sources have
advertised as a large-scale operation is, in fact, misleading. I
can say that such statements had more of a propaganda value than
anything else. One can say the same thing about the military
operations against Southern Kurdistan. We have not figured out
exactly the reason for this exaggeration. The Turkish army has
not undertaken an operation or activity that surpassed what it
has been doing ever since the beginning of the year. The Turkish
army had entered Haftanin [a guerrilla region] twice before. The
Turkish army has a permanent force, presence, and emplacements in
Southern Kurdistan. There were two operations against the
Haftanin camp and similar operations against Metina, Gare, and
Xakurke. The latest operation was of the same scale as the past
operations mentioned above. But for some reasons or other, Turkey
had not made this much noise about the previous operations. And
now, they felt a need to exaggerate the last operation. Reactions
of various circles concerning the latest operation were also
disproportionate. We wonder why they did not show a comparable
reaction against previous operations. Most likely, the latest
reactions are related to the sentence at Imrali and developments
that followed. Currently, each country reacts in the light of its
own interests. Military operations have been taking place piece
by piece in every region of Kurdistan. Against Southern
Kurdistan, too, the Turkish army had operations after the
decision in Imrali. Operations are ongoing in Zagros, Botan,
Amed, Mardin, and Dersim. The operation to the South covered a
narrow region beyond the emplacements of the Turkish army.
Perhaps the operation was initiated at the request of the KDP and
with the participation of the KDP. We know that units associated
with Nechirvan Barzani [about a thousand men, as reported by the
Turkish press] crossed into Uludere [in Northern Kurdistan] and
participated in attacks that swept from North to South.
     There was rather a concentration of forces. It was an
operation that lasted 5-6 days. It was one of the most
unsuccessful ones to date. An expected, a number of clashes took
place, as was the case in past operations. The casualties from
both sides were as our guerrilla sources reported.

Q: How do you assess the PUK's statements made during the
Washington talks that it would not fight against the PKK? How do
you interpret the lack of a change in the approach of the KDP
against the PKK?

     Another set of negotiations [between the PUK and KDP] came
to an end in Washington, D.C. No visible gains were made. For the
last few days, both the PUK and the KDP representatives have
released public statements. The KDP was the first to make a
statement. It blamed the U.S. for the outcome. The KDP stated
that nothing fruitful could be achieved in northern Iraq via
the U.S. approach. The PUK followed it with a statement to the
same effect. I guess this summarizes the outcome of the
negotiations in Washington, D.C. What emerged in the name of
willpower is not very strong at all. The parties from the South
did not obtain from the U.S. - whom they trust so much - what
they wanted. In a sense, their latest statements reflect a
disappointment and hopelessness. It seems that there are
powers and actors who are hampering progress and preventing a
solution in the South. We have always asserted this: If the
Kurdish question in the North, in Turkey, is not solved, nowhere
else will it be solved. A solution in the North is now more
essential than ever. In fact, one could say that the search for
a solution to the Kurdish question has shifted to the North and
this will be more of a future trend.
     As to the KDP's stance towards us: This party has tied
itself with outside forces and remains in their circle of
influence. This is a very negative and inauspicious position. The
Kurdish National Congress (KNC) issued statements to the effect
that Kurdish organizations should solve their conflicts among
themselves and strengthen Kurdish national unity. From the very
outset we have stated that we would support the KNC's work and
respond to its calls positively. We will always abide by its
decisions. We think the KNC should put more efforts into this
[Kurdish unity]. We will support all efforts of the KNC in this
regard since it is in a position to represent the will of the
Kurdish people as a whole. The KNC should include the KDP and
any other organization into these efforts, too. We will do all we
can to help the KNC to succeed.
     We will see changes in the U.S. policies toward Southern
Kurdistan. The PUK understands this, but cannot overcome its
weaknesses. If they have truly decided not to fight against us -
we have not received any official statements from them - it is
because they see what is coming. Theirs is a realistic
assessment, but a weak response. They should be more assertive.
We do not expect them to say "we will not fight against the
PKK", but they could very well say, "we should include the PKK in
finding a solution to the problem. We have to learn to live
together within a democratic system." This is the way to go if
the PUK wants to become a national democratic force. The PUK
should be encouraged to break the stalemate.

Q: What does Mr. Ulugbay's, Turkey's State Minister, attempted
suicide mean?

     It is an unfortunate event, a sad affair from a humanitarian
point of view. However, his attempt also shows how pressured they
are. The regime is under stress. Actually, this has been the lot
of the regime's officials for some time now. The Prime Minister
made a statement on this issue. Some circles are trying to
concoct a cheap explanation. This is not right. The Prime
Minister's statement says something about Turkey. It is essential
to understand it. Turkey is, truly, going through a tough time.
It must develop solutions to its long-standing problems if new
suicides are to be avoided. This is the only way that can mend
the weaknesses and strengthen Turkey. Chairman Apo's assessment
at Imrali is correct: "The process of resolving the problem has
commenced." This is an unavoidable step for Turkey. The earlier
they understand this, the better off they will be.

Q: What do you make of the recent release of the Chairman of
HADEP and the 15 party officials at a time when the Kurdish
question is going through hot and tense days?

     If the release of the HADEP officials is also a step toward
finding a solution to the Kurdish conflict, it is timely, even
better and more significant. We, the ARGK, our party, and the
Kurdish side will respond in kind. Each positive step from
Turkish side will be answered with a positive step from our
side. It is good that everyone sees this thus and approaches us
with such spirits to create a trusting atmosphere. We say welcome
to the HADEP officials and hope that they have a better
comprehension of this phase and adopt a more active struggle -
which they had pursued in prison - too. We wish them all success.

(Source: 'Ozgur Politika' - July 15, 1999 - Translated by Kurdish
Media)